近期，我院张自力老师为第一作者合作的论文《Administrative monopoly regulation and corporate tax avoidance - evidence from China》正式发表在《Finance Research Letters》2023年第12期。

反行政垄断是保证市场发挥资源配置作用的重要举措。文章尝试从企业税收规避的角度理解反行政垄断的潜在影响。理论上，反行政垄断对垄断企业避税有两种可能的作用。一方面，反行政垄断会增加垄断企业的经营风险，提高垄断企业的避税意愿；另一方面，反行政垄断会强化市场竞争的治理作用，抑制垄断企业的税收规避。使用2012-2020年我国A股上市公司的数据，借助2016年颁布实施的《公平竞争审查制度》作为准自然实验，我们研究发现《公平竞争审查制度》实施后，行政垄断企业的避税程度显著下降。机制检验表明，《公平竞争审查制度》实施后，行政垄断企业受到的分析师的关注增加、公司披露的信息质量提升以及管理层的所有权也有增加，这种外部监督的加强和内部激励的增加减少了其避税冲动。异质性分析表明，《公平竞争审查制度》对企业避税的抑制作用在短期偿债能力强、融资约束弱、内部控制无缺陷的企业中表现更为明显。

摘要：This study examines the impact of administrative monopoly regulation on corporate tax avoidance. Using the difference-in-difference (DID) methodology and data from A-share listed companies for the period 2012–2020, we find that China’s Fair Competition Review System (FCRS) significantly reduces tax avoidance by administrative monopolies. Possible channels include increasing analyst attention, improving quality of corporate disclosure, and increasing management ownership. The enhanced external monitoring and increased internal incentives resulting from the implementation of the FCRS reduce the tax avoidance impulse of administrative monopolies. Heterogeneity analysis shows that the dampening effect of the FCRS on tax avoidance is more pronounced among firms with strong short-term solvency, weak financing constraints, and defect-free internal controls.